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From protecting to performing privacy
Garfield Benjamin
Solent University
Privacy is increasingly important in an age of facial recognition technologies, mass
data collection, and algorithmic decision-making. Yet it persists as a contested
term, a behavioural paradox, and often fails users in practice. This article critiques
current methods of thinking privacy in protectionist terms, building on Deleuze's
conception of the society of control, through its problematic relation to freedom,
property and power. Instead, a new mode of understanding privacy in terms of
performativity is provided, drawing on Butler and Sedgwick as well as Cohen and
Nissenbaum. This new form of privacy is based on identity, consent and collective
action, a process to be performed individually and together to create new
structures that instil respect at the heart of our sociotechnical systems.
Keywords: privacy, performativity, contextual integrity, data, identity, consent,
power

The prevailing culture of privacy is centred on the assumption that it is
something that needs to be protected. But this framing has mired privacy
in fear and helplessness born of protectionist thinking. That is not to say
that the affective impact of fear cannot be a force for radical change.
Indeed, Sedgwick’s (2003) performativity stems from affect, a collective
process of feeling and learning, and thereby action. Critiquing protectionist
privacy does not erase its importance, but acknowledges its basis as a call
for change upon which performative conceptions can emerge as a
constructive and collective contrast. But the privacy paradox shows that
increased knowledge of threats does not inspire users to better protect
themselves (Mamonov & Koufaris 2016; Black et al. 2018). Defensive
perspectives tend towards a sense of inevitability, carried through cultural
representations in film, literature, games and the press whereby privacy
becomes a battle already lost to the all-powerful spectres of government,
business or malicious hackers. And yet, privacy is worth protecting. Or, at
least, it is worth ensuring users have control over access to their data and
metadata if and when they want it. Privacy is a temporal and political
issue, and the harms of new technologies are often distributed unequally
and visible only in retrospect. How, then, can we support privacy without
resorting to failed protectionism? There are a series of emerging debates
and conceptions of privacy that are making progress towards this aim,
which we here suggest can be best encapsulated as performing privacy.
Writing just before the recent swing back in favour of privacy—in the wake
of mass surveillance revelations, social media data scandals and
advances in facial recognition—Cohen found resistance to privacy (in
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favour of the Silicon Valley rhetoric of innovation or post-9/11 government
expansion of security powers) to be based on the problem that “legal
scholarship has conceptualized privacy as a form of protection for the
liberal self. So characterized, privacy is reactive and ultimately inessential”
(Cohen, 2013, p. 1905). Cohen moves beyond the liberal self with a
poststructuralist and social constructivist framework that emphasises the
importance of performativity in the construction of the relational,
multivalent, networked self of contemporary privacy (2012, p. 129).
However, she refuses to endorse any particular theory (p. 147), and her
use of performativity remains focused on the constructive process of
identity formation and a deconstructive critique of sharing, rather than the
constructive and reconstructive relational context in which privacy itself
might be performed.
Cohen's position acts as a useful basis for positioning the subject(s) of
privacy amidst the messiness, embeddedness and heterogeneity of
culture (2012, p. 267). But performativity calls into question not only the
liberal subject but also the emphasis on autonomy (see, for example,
Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 2) that underpins legal understandings of
the subject. Examples such as regulating to enforce value-centred design
—as the iterative construction of norms—therefore need pushing further
into elaborating more explicitly performative enactments of privacy as a
collective practice, moving beyond performative identity and privacy
(Cohen, 2008, p. 187) towards a performative conception of privacy. In
order to fully embrace a performative approach, and to collectively apply
such an approach in practice, we must therefore move beyond asking
what function privacy performs and instead ask how we can perform
privacy together. That is the topic of this discussion.
The definition of privacy used in this article expands on Nissenbaum’s
concept of “contextual integrity” as appropriateness and flow (2004), later
expanded to include contexts, norms, actors, attributes (types of
information) and transmission principles (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 129f),
although to some extent these are all subsumed within both contexts and
norms. Nissenbaum’s framework offers a negotiation of the specificity and
interrelatedness of different spheres or contexts and the new cultures that
emerge therein (Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 38), it is both “heterogeneous and
thickly integrated with social life” (p. 43). Integrated into all aspects of
society, privacy cannot be compartmentalised (Nissenbaum, 2010, p.
128), for the flow of information is embedded in any human society
through all levels of interaction. Contextual Integrity as a concept offers a
relational and embedded definition of privacy which is usefully extended
by thinking in terms of performativity, such as emphasising the temporal
aspects of contexts as continued social engagement and (re)construction
over time.
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Building on gender theories of the performative and periperformative acts
that constitute social structures (Butler, 1988, 2015; Sedgwick, 2003;
Green, 2007) situates privacy simultaneously in the individual and at the
root of broader systems of power. This article develops a performative
understanding of privacy in order to move beyond the descriptivenormative divide, towards thinking privacy as an active process and
thereby a more relevant framework for collective action. SkinnerThompson (2017) explores performative privacy in a legal context,
emphasising the act by individuals or groups of resisting surveillance in
public as expressive acts: hoodies and physical masks, online identity
masking tools, transgender rights, and head veils. An instructive
development from this legal perspective is that “functional demands for
privacy may also be viewed as legally-protected speech—as expressive”
and also as political (p. 1726). This is a useful move towards sharing as a
part of privacy, transcending the public-private divide, and establishing a
regulatory basis for performing privacy as empowerment. The approach
developed here pushes this argument further, beyond performing antisurveillance, into a fuller contextual way of thinking that incorporates
sharing and withholding, subject and audience, individual and collective,
and interdisciplinarity. Performing privacy requires a simultaneous shift in
all spheres: law, technology, ethics, politics, economics, and, perhaps
most importantly, culture.

Protecting privacy
Protecting privacy is often described as a “losing battle” (Kerry, 2018), yet
it persists as the focus of debates, particularly in technical and legal
spheres. This is perhaps an artefact of those specific fields, the need for
clearly definable terms and requirements for generalisable application and
enforcement. But society is not uniform, there is no one-privacy-fits-all. By
thinking solely in terms of technical and legal systems, we risk falling into
a defensive, protectionist position that fails to empower individual agency
by placing too much emphasis on broader structures. This escalation is
where individual circumstances, particularly those of marginalised or
underrepresented groups, get lost. It is therefore necessary to critique the
relation of privacy to the existing (often exclusionary) frameworks of
thought that are used to justify its problematic definition as something to
be protected.

Freedom
The most obvious justification for protecting privacy is through its
understanding in relation to freedom. In his highly influential text on
privacy and freedom, Westin defines privacy as “the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others” (2015 [1967], p.
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7). This suggests a core understanding of privacy in terms of protecting
freedom and the “right” to privacy, which is followed through in much legal
scholarship that tends towards taxonomising these rights (Solove, 2005,
2008). Such taxonomisation is widespread, although not without
limitations of contextual specificity and agent relativity (O’Callaghan, 2012,
pp. 16-17). A necessary protection made all too clear in the aftermath of
the Snowden revelations is from the state. This is of course an important
endeavour, and one in which organisations like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Privacy International, or Liberty Human Rights are essential.
But beneath this very clear and very real need—particularly for groups
historically persecuted by state apparatus (Browne, 2015) or to enable the
ability of journalists and political activists to operate in oppressive states
(Blum-Dumontet, 2019) - lies a problematic framework that places the
individual always as victim, as subject to the state’s grace.
Monitoring citizens has long been a function of the state, whether for
taxation or control. Expecting privacy protections against the state will
always be a qualified rather than absolute right, always easily traded for
the interests of the state. This is further complicated by the blurred
relations of access and privacy. For example, Rød and Weidmann show
that “regimes aiming to prevent any independent public sphere are more
likely to introduce the Internet” (2015, p. 338), while states with more
democratic systems (such as the US or UK) have a tendency to escalate
surveillance legislation disproportionate to their claims of promoting
freedom. This suggests that enhanced internet freedom, for example,
does not necessarily equate to enhanced privacy, building on the inherent
tension between freedom of information and right to privacy that suggests
a potential incompatibility with other freedoms.
If protecting privacy freedoms from governments is problematic, what of
protection from platforms and corporate interests? Structurally, this is to
some extent impossible. It is tech companies who collect, hold and
process our information on a daily basis. It is tech companies who
manage and control the infrastructure and platforms upon which digital
society operates. If protection of privacy from governments cannot be
relied upon, as we have seen, then it is also naive to expect protection of
privacy by governments. Recent developments in the wake of the GDPR
or the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal have led to a push for
regulation of big tech, but governments have been slow to act and have
thus far shown little in the way of meaningfully challenging the dominance
of major corporations. The underlying structure of freedom and rights in
online reality is predicated on a fundamental power asymmetry between
organisations (internet service providers, platforms, hardware
manufacturers, but also governments) and individuals.
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Another key area of freedom in which privacy protections must be
understood is from other individuals and, taken together, society as a
whole:
Privacy provides the self shelter from the storm; it gives the nascent self the
breathing space to develop, and the developed self a personal realm to exist as it
is, free from the prying eyes and corrosive influence of society. (Hill, 2004, pp. 5712)

At first glance, this situates privacy as a positive and empowering
protection. But who decides which influences are deemed corrosive? This
is particularly problematic when considering privacy from the family.
Children’s rights to privacy have recently been identified as an overlooked
issue (Children’s Commissioner for England, 2018), with parents and
schools (those supposedly there to protect children) often forming part of
the problem through sharing children’s data on social media, normalising
passive surveillance in education, or forcing engagement with privacyinvasive systems.
Privacy within and of the family unit is further problematised in relation to
gender. Maintaining the privacy of the family home (dating back to
Aristotle’s public-private divide) has long been an act of concealing abuse,
particularly of women. While bodily privacy is important for sexual rights
and empowerment, it can also be used to protect systemic abusers,
carried forward onto digital devices in the form of (legal) “stalkerware” or
“spouseware” (Greenberg, 2019). Viewing privacy as protection—as
freedom, and as the specific rights of a given legal framework—is a
process of layering, prioritisation and discrimination. Whose freedom
comes first? Sedgwick notes how performative frameworks and
periperformative contexts (discussed below) can expose the risks of
privacy in, for example, the violence of slavery within quasi-familial
contexts (2003, p. 83). These issues of freedom are of course part of a
long debate going far beyond privacy, but they call into question the
justification of privacy as a protection. Thinking privacy in terms of
protecting freedom will always be disproportionately ineffective for
marginalised groups, amplifying existing inequalities in societies for which
equal rights are a mythical ideal rather than an enforceable reality.
Privacy legislation is severely limited in practice. It relies on a patchwork of
other rights and protections such as disability, genetic or other legislation
(Horvitz & Mulligan, 2015), and remains “weak, incomplete, and fractured”
(Bamberger & Mulligan, 2011, p. 249). Current regulation is merely an
enforced minimum upon which individual organisations must build their
own privacy framework (often finding legal loopholes, particularly for
manipulating consent over time). Mulligan and Horvitz (2015) demonstrate
how privacy can be used to help prevent discrimination by limiting access
to information that could be used to discriminate (p. 253), but that the
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same process can hinder the recognition of discriminatory classifications
subsumed in other identifying pieces of information from which inferences
generate discrimination (Dwork and Mulligan 2013, p. 37). An example of
this is Facebook’s differential advertising of real estate not explicitly
grounded in race but still discriminatory by latching onto associated
identifiers such as neighbourhood that racially stratify communities in
practice.
Even the apparent protections of anti-discrimination discourse around bias
in data and algorithms are often overly instrumental, based on “the liberal
rubric of rights, opportunities, and material resources” (Hoffmann, 2019, p.
909) in which privacy is reduced to consumer rights rather than taking into
account, for example, attacks on dignity. Hoffmann goes on to state that
privacy is not a “panacea” (p. 910) for bias and data-based harms, but
broadening the definition of privacy beyond a protectionist viewpoint could
allow us to better embrace the embeddedness of different social and
technological principles in how individuals are defined, operationalised,
and (mis)treated with technology. Escaping the corporate definitions of
privacy (and consent, discussed below) used for terms and conditions or
PR stunts is an essential step. This would enable privacy to better support
the project of addressing broader social inequalities and the pursuit of
justice for marginalised groups.
But beyond these practical and systemic clashes within privacy, we can
also ask whether privacy is even conceptually compatible with freedom.
As Mokrosinska (2018) suggests, “privacy as control over access [...] is
about normative control involving a moral claim on the part of the agents
to limit the liberty of anyone else to search for information or to interfere
with their decisions.” In this understanding of access control—already
narrowing its usefulness and undermined by, for example, the Right to Be
Forgotten in which privacy comes into conflict with a host of other rights
and public interests—privacy is in fact not a freedom but a limit on it.
Privacy as normative control is an act of closing off, of separation.
Thinking this way undermines the positive component of privacy and
contextual integrity as also being concerned with sharing and the building
of social connections.
Privacy may involve protection (of identity, of consent, of autonomy), but a
protectionist rhetoric of privacy displaces these other concerns into a
tradeable right that all too often loses out to grander concerns of the loci of
power (whether in patriarchal family structures, corporate boards, or
government agencies). But protecting privacy as a process of individual
self-defense (Cohen, 2008, p. 201) also fails in the collective implications
of information leakage or exploitation such as the similarities in genetic
information of family members, the relational information of one’s contacts
or communication metadata, or the normalising effects of data en masse
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as a tool for discrimination. Perhaps this is why privacy has been
described as “the lost right” (Mills, 2008). Protecting privacy as a freedom
fails at the limit of those protections, a brittle edge past which marginalised
individuals and groups are easily abandoned.

Property
Personal data—and therefore the understanding of privacy—is
increasingly defined as property. Igo highlights the 1960s as one of the
“critical episodes” (2018b, p. 3) in which privacy came to be understood in
terms of property (2018a), alongside the rise of the surveillance society
(2015), forming a social shift that instigated new legal protections. While
Igo’s broader history of privacy (2018b) remains US-centric and limited by
the fallback to problematic legal discourses of autonomy and freedom, it is
instructive on the two-sided anxieties of privacy. Igo importantly
emphasises the sociocultural impact and breadth of the language of
privacy debates, and its embeddedness within society (p. 6). Thinking
about privacy as property is unhelpful not only when used by companies
justifying access to data in return for access to services, but also in
positive attempts to transfer ownership of data back to individuals, offering
them the choice of whether, to whom and for how much to trade away
their data. Fundamentally, this does nothing to question the economic
power structures and access control. The “data is the new oil” rhetoric
emphasises a transactional approach to privacy that, ultimately, only
serves private (business) interests.
Zuckerberg’s declaration that “the future is private” (2019) therefore
highlights an act of encryption-washing that protects privacy from
government surveillance while making the future of data fully privatised
under corporate ownership. But data is not even treated as carefully or
regulated as thoroughly as oil, but the metaphors (alternatives relate to
water) as a combined force of nature to be tamed and resource to be
exploited, evoking abundance, volatility and necessity while excluding
humans (Puschmann & Burgess, 2014; Stark & Hoffmann, 2019). This
has the further effect of reducing individuals to their expression as
measurable data points. Hildebrandt builds on the suggestion that “not
everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can
be counted (Cameron, 1963, p. 13), to suggest privacy as the “protection
of the incomputable self” (Hildebrandt, 2019). Nakamura labels this a
problem of cybertypes as “menu-driven identities” that reduce dynamic
and expansive categories such as race or gender into minimal options in a
“clickable box” that erases aspects of identity (2002, pp. 101-102). This is
particularly the case for those between conventional normative identity
markers, such as “the experiences of trans people [which] lay bare the
limits of rigid or fixed data categories for capturing fluid or multifaceted
identities” (Hoffmann, 2018a, p. 11). This highlights problems with
empowering the multiple or networked self that Cohen (2012) elaborates,
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as many are left no choice but to conform to (often incorrect) reductionist
categories for access or representation.
Data as property to be possessed therefore raises the question of
dispossession, as both the submission (subjection) of the subject to norms
of recognition (in the performative construction of the subject) and the
disowning or abjection of subjects by ideological norms (Butler &
Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 1-2). Athanasiou highlights how “transgender
suspends the certainties of having versus not having” (p. 55), calling into
question the notion of gender (and here, by extension, any identity
markers or data points) as property. The incomputable self, the self
beyond menu-driven identities, the queer self, and the dispossessed self,
call into question the very validity of identifying data beyond being a tool
for political control. Pushing for equality in the application of privacy
protections must entail an act of resistance towards the underlying system
of measurement, production and capitalism that limits, for example,
Zuboff’s (2019) critique of surveillance and misuse of personal data.
Without changing the power asymmetries of capitalism, corporations will
always seek to mobilise new technologies for profit. Protecting individual
data as property does little to combat these cultural dynamics.
Facebook has demonstrated this in court by attempting to argue that their
users have “no expectation of privacy” (Thalen, 2019). This shows a
conflation of two different expectations: being in public socially and having
one’s data exploited by a company. And yet the justification had already
been used in a Canadian court against an individual claiming a breach of
privacy (Zaman & Rudner, 2019). While concrete cases have thus far
been only in specific scenarios (such as individuals being involved in
employee group chats), Facebook itself clearly sees the principle as a
general rule for their platform. This framework, based on data transferring
to a platform as property, completely undermines privacy as freedom.
Treating data as property entails treating users as products, an
objectification of the population within corporate interests. In this system it
is not only employees but users too who are considered human resources,
with the customer now being other corporations seeking advertisement
and influence.
We should also be wary of privacy as a branding exercise, and oppose the
framing of privacy as a commodity (for the wealthy) that emerges from
defining privacy as property. But even shifting ownership to users can fall
into the protectionist dilemma. A report by the Open Data Institute recently
concluded that “data is not capable of constituting property in the legal
trust sense” (Reed et al., 2019, p. 12). This calls into question the legal
basis of “data trusts” as collective alternatives to platform ownership of
data, and raises further questions about considering privacy as property in
a more general sense. Thinking in terms of property, and in particular its
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protection, not only runs counter to net ideals of openness but also
exacerbates existing inequalities. Understanding privacy in terms of
protecting property can never be for everyone. Even within protectionist
perspectives, framing privacy as property has limited effectiveness at best
and acts as a method of commercialisation, exploitation, and control at
worst.

Power
Beneath both freedom and property lies protecting privacy as the systemic
protection of power in digital society. At first glance, and following the
ideals of many involved in the early days of the internet, privacy displays a
utopian relation to power. Privacy enables the creation of enclaves as
alternative spaces, protected from oppressive political forces. These
enclaves sustain a space in which alternative systems of power can
emerge, a radical counter to the enclosure of citizens in digital spaces
through privacy invasion (Andrejevic, 2009). In this sense privacy creates
spaces for political desire, and protecting privacy becomes a source of
empowerment. But entwined with informational power as control over
access to knowledge/resources in digital society, privacy is part of the
increasing “reality construction” by algorithmic governance (Just & Latzer,
2017). While privacy can act as a check on this use of data, as we have
seen there are few legitimate protections that genuinely support groups
and individuals marginalised by existing powers.
If technical tools are available, so the argument goes, the onus is on
individuals having the power to protect their own privacy, leading to
collective responsibility. But this focus risks inadvertently detracting from
the responsibility of tech companies and governments, and is hardly fair
on users considering the extent to which contemporary society is designed
to manufacture participation at the expense of privacy. Emphasising the
protection of power risks falling back on the complicity models prevalent in
surveillance studies and privacy culture (Monahan, 2018). Privacy is not
empowering if it involves exclusion from social reality, made worse by the
uneven distribution of privacy and lack of other options for those from
marginalised groups (such as the obstacles to privacy for those with
certain disabilities).
Even keeping one’s privacy, particularly as a marginalised group, can lead
to exclusion by creating data gaps: facial recognition technologies with
intersectional (mostly race and gender) inabilities to recognise faces
(Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Keyes, 2018); or lack of sex-disaggregated
data leading to a host of problems in health, work, safety, and
representation (Criado-Perez, 2019). Even within poststructural forms of
identity, we must remember that social relations are not always voluntary
but form within the constraints of existing systems of meaning and power
(Losh, 2015, p. 1651; Hoffmann, 2018a, p. 11). In light of this, if privacy is
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a system of power it is one that will always, one way or the other, fail for
the vast majority of the population.
Power exists asymmetrically in all aspects of society, and the ultimate
power—power over who lives or dies (Mbembe, 2003, p. 11)—is therefore
embedded throughout social relations. In defining this power of
necropolitics, Mbembe asserts that “death and freedom are irrevocably
interwoven” (p. 38), but also that death can take various material and
social forms of violence and exclusion (whether bodily, access to income
or severance from the rights and interactions of civil society). In this
context, socially disengaged technologies do “more than simply reflecting
problematic social attitudes, [they] reinforce and amplify them”, a systemic
act of cultural and symbolic violence (Hoffmann, 2018b). This “data
violence” is a digital form of institutional prejudice that is continually and
acutely felt by already marginalised groups such as the trans and
nonbinary communities. The iterative performance of this violence by
governments and platforms exacerbates the normalisation of exploitative
data practices and asymmetric systems of control around data use.
In a queer necropolitics, then, gender is pathologised in order to be
erased, ostensibly to protect privacy—of, for example, the enforced
suppression of pre-transition gender assignment in Iran (Shakhsari, 2014,
p. 109)—while enacting a necropolitical power over marginalised
communities through their quantification and exclusion. Butler warns that
we must be wary of pathologisation in order for recognition (2015, p. 54)—
particularly for trans people and the legal status of transition, and
particularly when it is combined with an enforced act of erasure by
external bureaucratic apparatus. This is a trend seen all too often in the
discriminatory classification of characteristics in machine vision datasets
that reduce individuals to perceived gender, racial, occupational, or health
assignments. The necropolitics of personal data extends also into the
afterlife, particularly for intersectional issues such as the appropriation of
the identities of murdered trans persons of colour to serve dominant
political rhetorics (Snorton & Haritaworn, 2013). The periperformative
context of privacy should therefore extend beyond the removal of an
individual from that context; integrity should be maintained regardless of
whether an individual has moved, disengaged or died. Forward integrity,
forward privacy is a collective periperformative duty.
Privacy can be used to both centralise and decentralise power. But the
decentralisation of power does not itself mean better privacy or more
power for individuals. Deleuze (1992) defines the society of control in
terms of access to data, and Galloway (2004) builds on this to suggest
protocols as the method of managing a decentralised control-based
society. Current calls for regulation of big tech show how this has played
out in practice, with companies able to amass power through the
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decentralised networks of the internet. These new powers not only
operate as loci of globalised wealth, but as controllers of access to
platforms and services that form informational (and thereby social) reality.
Privacy is not equal to power, but it is synonymous with how it operates in
control society, and provides a good indicator of where power lies,
highlighting existing inequalities and the commodification of power as the
purview of privilege. Protecting protocological power (which, as access
and control, runs parallel to privacy) does little for the individual as
decentralised systems generate new forms of oppression and exploitation,
a seeming drive towards global community underpinned by a “manifesto”
of access to personal data that condemns users to engage (Rider &
Wood, 2018). Corporate rhetorics of privacy—in both policies and
marketing—can be seen primarily as tools of mass disempowerment.
A protectionist standpoint makes it difficult to move on from thinking in
terms of power over, even so far as having power over one’s data.
Instead, privacy can be better thought of as empowerment—power to and
power with—both individually and collectively. This framing leads towards
a more performative and collaborative approach, and positions privacy as
a means of protecting other rights, such as freedom of assembly (Privacy
International, 2019). But protections around privacy also give platforms
“the capacity to disempower [users] at will” (Schwarz, 2019, p. 136). This
disempowerment also occurs at a systemic and structural level, with the
manipulation of consent through the increasing need to use data-collecting
platforms to access key networks for health, education, social, and other
needs. Noble (2016) highlights the need for intersectional critique of the
way “technological ecosystems” structure “detrimental narratives” in
service of “material disenfranchisement,” echoed by Hoffmann (2018a) in
the need to overcome the separation of different characteristics when
considering marginalisation and the impossibility of “uncomplicated claims
to neutrality or objectivity” (p. 7). The protectionist view, as a reductionist
and therefore contextually limited effort always doomed to fail, enacts a
sense of resignation cultivated by corporate power (Draper & Turow,
2019). This discussion has outlined how a protectionist approach to
privacy therefore concedes a continual losing battle for many individuals.
To reposition privacy as a positive force, and even to “protect” it, we need
alternative frameworks that inspire collective equality, equity, and action.

Performing privacy
The concept of performativity from gender theory provides a useful
framework to critique protectionist constructions of privacy and generate
positive collective performance (and thereby societal identity construction)
of privacy beyond and against the failed liberal idea of the Enlightenment
individual subject. Queer performative sociology allows us to broaden “an
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understanding of power to include identity formations as well as other
discursive formations” and “treating the construction of intersectional
subjectivities as both performed and performative” (Valocchi, 2005, p.
766). This approach promotes diversity and equality through emphasising
action and process rather than a state that obtains (to use legal
terminology) or needs protecting. Butler’s (1988) conception of
performativity is instructive in critiquing and mobilising the individualcollective relation of creating and entrenching constructed norms and roles
around which privacy and power accumulate.
The first step of performative privacy is emphasising the link between
individual and collective structures. As Butler writes:
The personal is thus implicitly political inasmuch as it is conditioned by shared
social structures, but the personal has also been immunized against political
challenge to the extent that public/private distinctions endure. (Butler, 1988, pp.
522–3)

Privacy is often thought of as protecting the individual, but in so doing it is
always already political and collective, part of a constructed social relation
of access/control based on the fundamental division of self and other
(Altman, 1975, p. 50, 1977, p. 67). Petronio (2002) attempts to push this
further by taking a more metaphorical and dynamic approach, but remains
focused on the construction of boundaries as the definition of the self. A
critical performative perspective therefore begins by challenging this
assumption, removing the public/private divide and envisioning privacy in
terms of a relational and contextual identity that is performed together.
Privacy does not disappear in public, it is performed in, through and with
publics and public spaces. Sedgwick (2003, p. 75) builds on Butler and
follows Derrida with thinking the performative as being self-referential
based in a historical (past and future) force beyond itself, but adds that we
must also consider the periperformative, an alloreferential occurring
temporally around a performative act to affirm or challenge it. The
periperformative is the context of a performative act—its social-relational
metadata—and the collective contribution to the performative utterance. In
the terms of Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity, the norms of privacy are
performative while contexts are periperformative.
A periperformative framing highlights the blurred boundary between the
individual, group or abstract entity, bridging personal and political
narratives. Periperformatives therefore “allude to explicit performative
utterances,” they describe or even negate the performative, they are
“about performatives” rather than being an act in themselves, “they cluster
around them” but with “no very fixed circumference” (Sedgwick, 2003, p.
68). Periperformatives acknowledge the assumed ‘they’ bearing witness to
a performative act, the collective component of privacy that situates and
supports an individual’s agency through collective enforcement. This can
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be used positively or negatively, to reinforce unequal power structures or
to enact radical change.
Performativity was used by Butler to critique social and individual
repetitions of fixed roles and identities, and this self-referential feedback
loop of identification and subjectification (notably in gender but also in the
wider categorisation of individuals as data) is difficult to escape. In this
context, the legal protections of the liberal self appear as one (narrow and
often negative) performance of perpetuating roles and constraining
contexts that fix individuals into prescribed norms, against which a gender
approach would require performative acts of resistance that emphasises
the fluid incomputable aspects of the poststructural self. Sedgwick writes
that the performative context, like a play, is “constituted as a spectacle
that denies its audience the ability either to look away from it or equally to
intervene in it” (2003, p. 72), and that “to disinterpellate from a
performative scene will usually require, not another explicit performative
nor simply the negative of one, but the nonce, referential act of a
periperformative” (p. 70). Overcoming performative repetition of
inequalities through critical periperformative disinterpellation of their power
structures and social contexts is therefore a necessary step towards
collectively performing privacy as the act of looking away, of refusing to
accept, engage in or bear witness to forced access to or exploitation of
data, even if that data is performed in public. What this means is using
collective contexts to challenge the normalisation of exploitation and
power inequality, removing the fear and risk from being in public (a
problem that goes well beyond privacy). It is a collective act of respect that
looks away.
This is a key issue of social media: the need to individually choose and
collectively support different audiences for different utterances without the
exploitation of corporate or state technical-legal systems that entrench
existing power structures. We must subvert and reappropriate the
compulsory witness of social constructs. This entails challenging the
assumption that a lack of privacy, for example, has become an
unavoidable part of life in networked society. It is a challenge to the
systemic forcing of participation in privacy-invasive platforms and
socioeconomic structures. For example, it is refusing to share privacyinvasive or hateful material online—or, better yet, refusing to watch or
read such material in the first place. We must shift from complicity in fearbased (self-)victimisation to collective performance of privacy as a positive
social construct when combined with the periperformative disinterpellation
of contextual integrity as an inherent part of the metadata of a speech act,
whether online or offline. In an age where metadata and our networks or
connections can undermine privacy even if the individual themselves is
apparently protected, we need to build new forms of trust in societal
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systems (Kerry, 2018), and in the integrity of social contexts, in order to
undertake collective action and empowerment.

Identity
Beyond the reductionism of control-based society that breaks up users
into static data points—the process of dividuation that converts individuals
into dividuals (Deleuze, 1992) which “are then governed automatically
through databases and levels of access and exclusion” (Whitson, 2015, p.
343)—we must push further into the fluidity of the self, past structural
regulation and into poststructural and relational debates as critiques of
subjects, information, and power in order to perform privacy. Thinking of
privacy in terms of identity is a useful framework for bridging individual and
collective acts and perspectives, as it can be used to emphasise
diversity—particularly the intersectional and context-specific concerns
around the implications or empowerment of privacy—and indeed to
support existing rights-based protections of privacy. It also extends, for
example, Nissenbaum’s focus on appropriate flow of information to
include, for example, bodily privacy or cyberphysical public spaces. These
are important areas for intersectional issues in privacy and the complex
relations between physical and digital identities.
Identity stands against privacy as property. Floridi (2015a) suggests that
we should let go of thinking about personal data in terms of the philosophy
of economics (the property-based framework of surveillance capitalism),
stop legislating in terms of ownership of data as a ‘thing’, and move
towards thinking personal data in terms of the philosophy of mind. In this
framing, my data is “mine because they constitute me” (Floridi, 2015a).
Privacy invasions are therefore less about trespassing (imposing on
another’s property) and more akin to kidnapping (taking another’s self).
This maintains the privacy of personal information or memories even when
they are acquired in a public place, for as Floridi points out, “kidnapping is
illegal even in public spaces” (2015a). He pushes this view further in
relation to the philosophy of memory, emphasising the right to be forgotten
(which he insists is an unhelpful name) as being about managing, or
‘closing’, memory:
dealing with closure has become difficult on the web, a flatland lacking historical
depth. [...] We must ensure that the right kind of personal information may be
remembered (no removal of past information) without being constantly recalled (no
unnecessary resurfacing of past information). (Floridi, 2015b, p. 43)

This temporal closure—the act of “remembering without recalling”—can be
understood as a collective act of periperforming the fact of remembering
without actually performing the recalling. It acknowledges the relationality
of access to information and supports social connections, while
maintaining an individual’s ability to control the temporal context of their
utterances.
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The ahistorical entrenchment of data as a flat ontology presents a barrier
to radical performativity. It is therefore important to think of the self not as
singular or fixed but as fluid: “an identity tenuously constituted in time—an
identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, 1988, p.
519). At first glance, data appears to run counter to performativity and to
privacy, abstracting identity into dividual units of categorisation that stick
inescapably with an individual across their various online interactions. But
if we think with Butler that identity is always a stylisation, we can reinsert
performance into data to challenge how it is operationalised by
surveillance (state or capitalist) systems. If we understand that data is only
ever a snapshot of one particular expression in one particular moment, we
can begin to establish a framework for supporting privacy through time.
Identity here is always plural, identified by Green in the long sociological
tradition of treating the self and identity as multiple and fluid (2007, pp. 278), working alongside and in tension with queer theory as “a radical antiidentity politics [that] rejects a stable, knowable subject” (p. 29). We must
therefore insert a separation, a “performative interval” which “marks the
distance between doing and identity whereby the doing (e.g., doing
woman) represents practice and identity (e.g., female) an interior
semblance of self” (p. 32). Data and identities are both only ever a
semblance, a representation, and interpretation. They are always
relational and always suggest a separation from the individual as they
appear within the performative context.
Butler insists that we must “understand constituting acts not only as
constituting the identity of the actor, but as constituting that identity as a
compelling illusion, an object of belief” (1988, p. 520). Within any given
performative context (work, family, social media, gaming) we collectively
agree to the periperformative framework within which we sustain the
illusion of fixed measurable identity. But if, as Butler follows de Beauvoir in
the idea that one is never born but only becomes a woman, we assert that
facticity (and its expression in data) is separate from cultural meaning,
then we can start to mobilise this belief for productive performative ends.
And is all of cyberspace not, as a cultural representation of networks and
data, a “consensual hallucination” (Gibson, 1995 [1984], p. 67)? If so, it
can be created to represent corporate or state interests, or recreated as a
new stage in which the collective belief in privacy empowers users
together. We become categories of data, and can do so as a critical
operation in which we also become otherwise, performing across
categories as we perform different (parts of our) identities.
Beneath the performance of identification, dissolution and fuzzy
boundaries that constitute our identities—into the importance of the
uncountable and incomputable (Hildebrandt, 2019)—we must therefore
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always include the performative interval between data and self as part of a
periperformative social and spatiotemporal context, separating our fluid
inner selves from their countable utterance as data. Athanasiou
emphasises recognition and the act of revealing as important for trans
people in particular (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 56). This shows the
entwined nature of sharing and keeping secret within privacy, and the
periperformative aspect of the appropriateness of information flow, use
and response. This is a profoundly political project that acknowledges and
attempts to overcome the forcing of quantified identities on individuals
through excessive categorisation by indifferent or malicious institutions.
Performing identity as privacy means being heard. It is therefore also a
struggle against “data violence” (Hoffmann, 2018b) and the systems of
power that convert performed identity into subjectification and oppression.
Performing privacy as identity includes our online interactions that occur
outside our usual ontologies: asynchronous, multiple, and apparently
immaterial. It is thus through the act of performing identity (whether
countable, uncountable, or relational) that we are embodied less in data
than in metadata. Identities are always implied, always speculative, as
they emerge from what is left out of data but suggested through metadata.
It is therefore important to perform identity as a limit of the dissolution of
the self, constantly recreated in the social contexts of specific relations of
access and control, or privacy. Performing privacy invites us to embrace
the uncountable, the fluid, and the multiple in our construction of identity.
Performing privacy empowers greater ability to perform the self.

Consent
Alongside identity, it is fitting in thinking privacy as a performative process
to consider consent as a driving framework for determining social
relations. Consent has been a core component of queer privacy (Lewis,
2017, p. 1), emphasising the everyday struggles of marginalised groups
as well as the blurred boundaries between the many different intersecting
populations that form global digital society. For Lewis, privacy requires
understanding of different needs, including the different contexts in which
one might want or need privacy, and that this in turn requires diverse
voices in the debate: “nothing about us, without us” (p. 2). This includes
the role of privacy in issues of domestic abuse, workplace or public
prejudice, online dating and connected sex, as well as an integral aspect
of sharing. Privacy as contextual integrity overcomes the constraining
conception of access control as a limiting, secretive and protectionist
process.
Privacy always includes sharing, as long as it respects the consent of the
relational network involved in the act of sharing and the information
shared. While this must always be understood temporally (it is consent
during or for a specific interaction, but also incorporates privacy in memory
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and the right to be forgotten), taking a performative approach to the issue
is thereby a better support even for freedom, property, and power than a
protectionist framework. If we perform openness, we can enable
transparency, accountability, and access to necessary information. But
this is part of the same performance that collectively negotiates trust over
the use of information. An example is access to sexual health advice. This
is necessary for individuals, particularly women (and even more
specifically, younger women or those from communities in which such
advice may not always be available as a matter of course), in order to
enable their autonomy and support their self-development. But the
metadata surrounding this exchange of information (whether it is the
contents of any discussions or the very fact of searching online for advice)
should remain private, to enable informed autonomy and the construction
of a supportive community. As Altman suggests, autonomy must be
extended to the “social psychological process” of regulating interpersonal
contact (1977, pp. 69, 83). But this too must be extended into the creation
of collective contexts and maintaining the integrity of such social relations,
in order to reach a notion of privacy beyond separation.
The broader context is also important as part of this relational act of
privacy, including issues of age, assault or abuse, termination, and other
aspects that may require a performative and periperformative blurring of
privacy to ensure relevant accountability and support without victimising
the person seeking advice. In this example, privacy is collectively
performed in the act of making public a request for advice (whether
directly to another human and/or through digital platforms to connect the
individual with the most appropriate resources) which is then collectively
made private through the shifting of a periperformative context around the
act (i.e. no information is stored or shared unless consented is actively
given). In this sense, periperformativity can be considered also as the
metadata of privacy, the always-there third-person utterance “about” the
exchange (or not) of information that defines its collective privacy.
It is certainly true that existing consent mechanisms are inadequate,
particularly the “transparency and choice” or “notice and consent” models
that have come under intense criticism (Nissenbaum, 2011, pp. 34-36).
Even after steps such as GDPR, this corporately co-opted framework has
failed to provide individuals with adequate transparency and genuine
choice, consent as a concept forms a basis upon which to establish the
specific contexts around which integrity would form. For Nissenbaum, it is
the very concept of consent that is inadequate. We argue instead that
offering true consent—rather than forcing it—can be viewed as a
performative act that frames a context by an individual in conjunction with
the socially periperformative context within which the information flow will
operate. We can again return to the need to consider embodied
experiences of marginalised groups and reassess how we can use
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consent as an active performative framework. However, there are
warnings against the potential trivialisation of sex ethics as a metaphor for
data ethics (Stark & Hoffmann, 2019). Therefore, in leaning on consent
here, we do not wish to sexualise technology, which is often used as an
exclusionary tactic to prop up gender and racial power structures. Instead
we aim to highlight how sex and gender (and bodies more broadly) must
be taken into account within privacy. Doxing, revenge porn, online sexual
threats, stalkerware and biometric data are very real concerns that show
how the task of creating constructive periperformative privacy contexts
must always be made in connection to existing drives towards inclusive
and sensitive models of consent and identity.
Consent is no mere metaphor but part of an interconnected and
intersectional web of material, social, cultural and affective respect.
Models such as the “consentful tech” project (Lee & Toliver, 2017)—which
promotes consent as freely given, reversible, informed, enthusiastic and
specific - can offer practical methods of performing privacy. Consent
therefore moves towards Hoffmann’s call for a design culture of “support
and resources” without judgement, based in “empathy and thoughtfulness”
(2018b). Privacy as consent requires a periperformative context of respect
that resists enforced participation and offers a genuine choice, genuine
agency for individuals and collectives to perform without exploitation. If
consent has failed in practice, it is because it has been built on
protectionist notions and relegated to a condition of data use (and thereby
misuse). Consent should form an underlying principle of privacy, an
inherent part of the context of information. Privacy-respecting standards,
models or presets (assuming no access rather than manipulating
conditions for access) might offer one way of enabling a (peri)performative
roles and relations in managing the appropriate flow of information.
Rather than rights, which in privacy will invariably fall back on defensive
terminology, consent shifts the emphasis from power over and even power
to, which hits a protectionist limit even as a ‘positive’ right, towards a
negotiation of the boundaries between power with and power within
(Veneklassen & Miller, 2002, p. 55), the need for self-knowledge,
respecting difference, and building solidarity for social transformation. As a
performance of consent at the blurred, relational boundary between
individuals or entities, power with forms the sharing of information (always
in a specific and limitable spatiotemporal context) while power within
occurs at the empowerment of control by the individual to recall consent at
any time. This sharing and resituating of power in and between individuals
grounds collective privacy as a mutual performance based on consent and
respect, and its links to existing sexual politics, regulation and legal
recourse provide a concrete framework for supporting and ensuring this
empowerment without resting on protectionist language.
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Comparisons are often made between Bentham and Foucault's
panopticon and surveillance mechanisms embedded in online society. But
these have become increasingly problematic. Tufekci (2014), among
others, have shown that where the panopticon functions as a constantly
visible possibility of surveillance, digital surveillance is an invisible
constant certainty. But (as Tufekci suggested may happen in the wake of
the Snowden revelations) the situation is more complex and indeed more
performative. Users are aware of and concerned about the risks to their
privacy, but this is not often embodied in their behaviour. This is the
privacy paradox in which users know that they most certainly are being
constantly monitored, but act as if that is not the case (Black et al., 2018),
an oppressive social performance that underlines digital surveillance
society. Digital surveillance has become simultaneously visible and
invisible.
Power in such a structure exists everywhere and nowhere, coalescing
around those who control the platforms and network infrastructure. In such
a society of control (Deleuze, 1992) or protocol (Galloway, 2004), there is
a fundamental barrier to true consent as access is not only limited but also
to a certain extent enforced in order to engage with social reality in digital
society. Critical performative interventions are required to challenge this
self-perpetuating illusion of choice. If “the performance renders social laws
explicit” (Butler, 1988, p. 526), then we must collectively adjust our
periperformative context in order to refuse the current system. If
performative reality “is real only to the extent that it is performed” (p. 527),
then it can also be performed otherwise. There is an urgent need to
address these issues of consent in our escalating data-driven,
cyberphysical, algorithmically governed, ‘smart’ society.
Fear-based privacy has failed large swathes of the population, and a more
positive, collective model is required. A report by the Our Data Bodies
project on data collection in major urban areas in the US found that
citizens have a desire for “power not paranoia” (Petty et al., 2018, p. 19)
and “want to be seen, not watched, and heard, not harmed” (p. 22). This
notion echoes Chun’s call for the means of being in public without being
exploited (2016). Consent-based performative privacy moves towards
achieving this aim, using the theatrical component to performative acts
that designate a specific stage or arena in which acts occur and
consequently in which the corresponding social structures emerge (Butler,
1988, p. 527). Consent is required by both the actor(s) and audience(s),
but should also be considered ongoing in memory (biological and
technical), with consent (and its conditions such as the level of attribution
or anonymisation) being able to be withdrawn at any time. This goes well
beyond specific legal methods of withdrawal, such as the problematic
Right to be Forgotten, into the very structure of information society.
Privacy as consent is a complex, global, spatiotemporal relation of
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information flow that forms social bonds through collective respect of the
performative acts and the periperformative contexts in which they are
situated.

Action
The performative act is “both that which constitutes meaning and that
through which meaning is performed or enacted” (Butler, 1988, p. 521),
not a matter of expressing (which suggests prior existing categories) but of
doing (p. 528). Green suggests that “queer theory focuses on the
performative failure—that is, the inability of the individual to fully realize
the concept and lay claim to ontological status” (2007, p. 32). In other
words, privacy is about becoming, not being. This is a critical-creative
process building on two concepts of performance. The performative action
is an introverted deconstructive speech act but is also at the same time an
extroverted theatrical act (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 7). In this sense, performing
privacy is a matter of agency over the division, signification and display of
(parts of) our identities and our social realities.
Butler (1988) writes of the performative as a “constituted social
temporality” (p. 520) with possibilities for cultural transformation, formed of
the acts of individuals, taken together, which can perform radical acts
which question the existing structure and can thereby constitute new
social structures (p. 523), through the power of subversive performances
that can change the cultural field (p. 531). This is the focus of SkinnerThompson’s performative analysis of “anti-surveillance camouflage” that
frames privacy “less as defensive efforts for secrecy, and more as
affirmative acts of expression” (2017, p. 1734). These techniques
(including masks, makeup or clothing) build on privacy as integral to
identity. However, they also risk merely enacting “an aestheticization of
resistance premised on individual avoidance rather than meaningful
challenge to the violent and discriminatory logics of surveillance societies”
(Monahan, 2015, p. 159). The performative challenge to existing power
structures requires a periperformative desire (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 74) for
collective action beyond the individual act. The periperformative can also
“dramatize the pathos of uncertain agency, rather than occluding it as the
explicit performative almost must” (p. 76). Between the performative and
the periperformative, the act and its context(s), is a negotiation of the grey
areas, an embracing of the diversity and even difficulty of constituting
positive collective action.
Nissenbaum attempts to demarcate separate spheres of influence for law,
politics and social norms (2004, pp. 156–157). This is surprising given her
emphasis on the complexities of different public/private spheres beyond
clear-cut divisions. Similarly, her assertion that abortion should be a
component of a full theory of privacy (which indeed it should), sits against
her exclusion of "courtship" from regulation (victims of abuse, sexual
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assault, or rape would beg to differ). She also places the political as only
relevant in extreme cases of violation, which again seems entirely
unsatisfactory to feminist and gender perspectives. While avoiding the
legal default to regulation as a solution, Nissenbaum fails to fully integrate
policy within politics and society. These combined methods should be
considered within any given context. This is perhaps why Nissenbaum’s
contextual integrity has preference for status quo (2004, pp. 144–145). As
existing contexts are never neutral and almost never equal, this is a
worrying starting point. While acknowledging justified change, there is the
question of influence over norms (particularly when considering the oftenbiased positions of mainstream legal and political institutions), and the
entrenching of particular already dominant interests. A performative
approach, by contrast, acknowledges the perpetuation of social norms (in
a way that is sensitive to both prescriptive and descriptive definitions) but
also provides a means for bottom-up change, representation for
marginalised groups, and a challenge not only to the status quo but the
systems of power that define and maintain the status quo.
The first step towards privacy as social action is to generate more positive
and more productive information cultures. Like identity, culture is always
plural here, for there are diverse and intersectional perspectives to take
into account when designing systems that support the privacy
requirements of all users. Generating new cultures occupies Butler’s call
to action: “to do, to dramatise, to reproduce”, to embody in the
“materialising of possibilities” as a dramatic act (1988, p. 521). But in
creating these new meanings there is also the need for “articulating
periperformative choices that create highly charged thresholds of
meaning” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 82) to challenge asymmetries in agency.
We can thereby create the context in which more positive acts/social
structures can be performed. Lewis asserts that “Queer Privacy is about
building tools to destabilize and destroy the status quo” (2017, p. 3),
echoing Sedgwick’s push for moving beyond the exemplary (2003, p. 79)
by creating not single examples but a framework of tools and practices for
constant critical creation of new social norms, an approach suited to the
nuances of cultural diversity and specificity of marginalised groups.
Performing privacy in action is to critique existing structures of data
collection and exploitation with new utterances of identity and consent in
socio-relational networks built on choice, agency, and respect.
Performativity as a collective act stands from and against precarity—not
identity—as the “rubric” that brings together intersectional marginalised
groups (Butler, 2015, p. 58). As Murakami Wood writes, “the more
precarious one’s conditions of existence and one’s class, racial, gender—
and so on—identity, the more that such markers become identifications,
the result of processes of control, and less identities, the product of selfdefinition” (2017, p. 45). Performing identity and privacy (including
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sharing) together as a collective act of resistance therefore undermines
the limited and discriminatory implications thrown up by thinking in terms
of rights and property. It is, then, not identification but (embodied or,
perhaps rather, embedded) presence that forms the collective identity of
resistance and the performative identity as part of such collective
resistance. This is about removing restrictions on the ability of an
individual or group to make a performative utterance and define the
context of such an utterance, the enabling of a position from which to
speak (or not). It is the creation of a space for action by creating a space
in which information norms can be questioned. This includes overcoming
menu-driven collection and quantified identities in favour of more
narrative, relational, and culturally embedded forms of collecting, storing,
and using data. It is a matter of social justice, therefore, to, for example,
replace limited dropdown menus of characteristics with qualitative and
narrative options. This is particularly the case for gender, which if
necessary should be an open text box rather than any given set of
prescribed options.
Better yet would be to develop temporally flexible approaches alongside a
constant questioning of whether any particular item of data should even be
collected in the first place. Useful here is Glissant’s (1997) mobilisation of
opacity as a force which protects the Diverse, against “reductive
transparency” (p. 62). It is the “real foundation of the Relation, in
freedoms” (p. 190), the basis for solidarity with the Other (p. 193), and
upon which transparency is imagined as part of a relation (p. 192). Blas
(2014, 2016) further expands this concept as a basis for contemporary
feminist and queer politics and aesthetics against the context and
assumption of total surveillance, a resistance to the normalising and
categorising expectations of intrusive and exclusionary social interaction.
Beyond this critique, privacy as action is the creative process of
generating new positive periperformative contexts through collected
individual speech acts that expect and respect privacy.

Conclusion
This article has presented an alternative to current protectionist
conceptions of privacy by critiquing the prevailing and often fear-inducing
definitions of privacy, as is seen across science, engineering, law, press,
and media. Protectionist measures, taking privacy as access and control,
are all too often co-opted by corporate and state actors in the society of
control, leading to helplessness on the part of users and citizens.
Highlighting the inherent difficulties in protecting privacy in relation to
traditional debates of freedom, property, and power, a new way of thinking
privacy has been proposed. In order to support privacy as an empowering
force for equality, diversity, and inclusivity, an outline for performing
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privacy has been detailed, building on gender theory and applying it to
identity, consent, and action as key components of building positive
cultures of privacy.
But privacy never occurs in isolation. Issues of performing identity and
consent in data are deeply embedded in our socio-technical relations.
Most obviously with data science, but in the society of control this leads
directly on to algorithmic decision-making, whether for content filters,
targeted advertising, access to healthcare or the ethics of self-driving cars.
Thus a related application of the framing of privacy presented here would
be useful in, for example, performing artificial intelligence as a collective
endeavour of trust and responsibility. We can also look to further theories
that would inform the ongoing debate and development, such as
Haraway’s “informatics of domination […] as a massive intensification of
insecurity and cultural impoverishment” (1991, p. 172) as well as her
situated knowledges and critique of partiality (1988), or Braidotti’s (2013,
p. 38f) critical posthumanism as a relational conception of humans with
blurred boundaries that overlap with ecological and technological
environments. Practical creative acts of performing privacy can also be
seen emerging in the Deep Lab collective supporting fluidity through
“multi-pseudonymous identity” (Wagenknecht, 2014, p. 12), Gibson’s
crypto-choreography and the performing of encryption (2018) or Blas’s
collective queering of facial recognition and surveillance (in the works
Facial Cages, Facial Weaponisation Suite and Contra-Internet which
move beyond individual protection into a collective performance of identity
as privacy). Performing privacy offers a mode of thinking that supports
positive acts by individual users as part of a collective effort to create
alternative social structures in which privacy can become an integral part
of digital communication and social relations.
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